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The duality of Tony: Assessing the Matildas' Gustavsson era

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How the USWNT avoided the trap game vs. Australia (1:01)

Sam Borden breaks down the U.S. women's soccer team finishing up group play with a 2-1 win over Australia. (1:01)

In the simplest terms and the most convenient definitions, Tony Gustavsson's tenure as head coach of the Matildas will be remembered for four things.

It all began with the Matildas' best result at an Olympics. Their fourth-place finish in Tokyo in 2021 was a realisation that the potential many people saw in this team was closer in reach than previously thought.

It was a seminal moment. Australia, still deep in COVID pandemic lockdowns, watched on as Gustavsson's side fought to a 4-3 quarterfinal victory over Great Britan, breaking a barrier that had plagued the national team for decades. After only five games in charge prior to that first game, and not one of them a victory, many had thought the Tokyo Olympics would be a write-off. Instead, it became one of the highlights of the era. It was lucky but lots of good things are; football teams need to take their winks from the universe when they can.

The great result at the Olympics all of a sudden made the 2022 Asian Cup look winnable, particularly after back-to-back losses in the final in the tournament's previous two editions.

Which brings us to the second defining moment of the Gustavsson era: the Matildas' worst result at an Asian Cup. Their quarterfinal exit at the hands of South Korea was widely deemed a failure, and rightly so. The manner in which the team was knocked out was frustrating too; a lack of finishing punished by a moment of brilliance from the opposition. The communication out of the camp about the purposes of the tournament wasn't always clear, with Gustavsson's twin aims of deepening the playing pool and winning the trophy at times blocking each other's progress.

Never was that more apparent than the decision to start a full-strength XI against Indonesia, getting an 18-0 win in the process, rather than giving significant game time to those in the squad with five caps or less.

That tournament in India remains the sliding doors moment of the Gustavsson era. What would have happened if the team's worst result at the continental showpiece was used as the justification for his sacking? Who would have come in his place? How would the team have fared at the World Cup? Would it have been better or worse than what actually panned out?

Fans are able to ask these questions without ever living their consequences.

In a lot of ways, the reaction to the Asian Cup exit, and the decision not to move Gustavsson on, has coloured all of the subsequent moments of his tenure. Wins have been accepted as evidence of progress. Losses were proof that the time to act had passed Football Australia by and to their detriment. Both arguably had some level of truth to them. Even now, at the end of this tenure, over two and half years on, whether or not Football Australia made the right call in backing their man feels as contentious as it did the day after the loss to South Korea.

If it is hard to forget about the Asian Cup exit, it is even harder to forget about the third stanchion of Gustavsson's tenure: the 2023 World Cup. The Matildas best result at the most important event in the football calendar.

What is maybe forgotten is the form in between the Asian Cup and the World Cup itself. Two losses to Canada in September 2022 felt like rock bottom. The Matildas themselves looked like all the joy had been sucked out of football for them as they sat in press conferences answering questions about how they would turn it around in time for the World Cup. Gustavsson spoke of processes, of getting one day better, of "preparation" and "performance mode."

They did turn it around though. A steady stream of positive results, against fancied opponents no less, built the expectations on the team. A win against Denmark here, a defeat of Spain there. Then there were victories over England and France in their two final hit-outs before the tournament for good measure. The Matildas were playing well. Defensive frailties had been tightened up. The implementation of Sam Kerr and Caitlin Foord as a pair up top, flanked by wingers, looked unstoppable. Confidence from wins was high.

The World Cup is seven games of football no one in Australia will soon forget. Not Steph Catley's calm leadership. Not Nigeria's rampant comeback. Not the breathtaking victory against Canada. Not the choice to include Kyah Simon in the squad when she clearly was not fully fit. Not the penalty shootout against France. Not Gustavsson's reluctance to make substitutions. Not Kerr's semifinal golazo. Not the ragged Matildas, dressed in teal, dejected at the end of the third-place playoff.

The highs of World Cup make item No.4 all the more crushing: The Matildas equal-worst showing at an Olympics, bowing out in the group stage last week. Are you starting to sense a pattern here?

It is true, the Matildas have missed out on Olympic Games all together since the sport was first introduced for women in 1996. But in order to have a worst showing at the Games, you actually need to be there. And only the team's debut in Sydney 2000 -- where they picked up a single point and finished seventh out of eight teams -- was worse. And not by much.

While the Olympic qualifiers suggested the good times were going to keep on rolling for the Matildas, two poor showings against Canada -- them again -- at the end of 2023 look all the more prescient in hindsight.

The last six months of the Gustavsson era have seen the Matildas look tired, trying to work through new game plans that didn't seem to ever take. All of this was happening while the team received more media attention than it ever had before and the players continued to slog through their domestic seasons in the A-League Women and abroad. All of those factors coalesced to produce what was seen in the south of France.

And that's the Gustavsson era in a nutshell: Two peaks and two troughs in four major tournaments.

Of course, those results don't take into account everything. Gustavsson was appointed at a critical juncture in the Matildas history not just because of the looming home World Cup but because the team had had two coaches in as many years after Alen Stajcic and Ante Milicic.

Gustavsson was charming and had a pocketful of catchphrases which made their way into the lexicon, but also grated when used in spite of what was delivered by the team on the pitch. He was wildly expressive, cared deeply about this team, and was endlessly meme-able. He was self-aware enough to know that he'd be called a bad coach when the Matildas lost, but seemingly never had full control of the narrative of his own tenure.

The fact of the matter is whatever you thought of Gustavsson was likely decided long before he and Football Australia made the decision to part ways last Thursday.

For many, he is the coach that brought the Matildas closer to a dreamed-about potential than they ever thought possible.

For just as many, he is the smooth-talking fraud with unsophisticated tactics who held the coaching job much longer than he should have.

Gustavsson is the man responsible for leading the Matildas to their two greatest global tournament results in history, and the guy who squandered Australia's best hopes of winning silverware on the global stage. Both can be true at the same time.

In a lot of ways, the measure of Gustavsson may only truly appear once the next manager's reign begins.

If the Matildas fail to do anything in the next cycle, will Gustavsson earn more credit for what was achieved? If the team succeed beyond everyone's wildest imaginations will Gustavsson be further criticized for not getting it done while he was in charge?

While the Gustavsson era exists as its own story, the Matildas story is one that never ends. It exists in the context of everything that came before it. We know Tokyo and the 2023 World Cup were good, because bad results had happened before. We know the Asian Cup and Paris were bad because good results had happened before them.

It does, however, feel safe to conclude that Gustavsson did extract everything that he could out of this Matildas team. His methods worked extremely well in the lead-up to the World Cup, but they no longer had the same impact a year later. It's also worth mentioning that in Clare Hunt (25), Kyra Cooney-Cross (22) and Mary Fowler (21), Gustavsson has established a spine of young players who should see the team through the next cycle, maybe even longer, of competition.

Over the past four years, interest in the Matildas has grown exponentially; more people care about the team than at any point in their long and storied history. As a consequence, the pressure has grown on the team too. More people than ever before want them to succeed and expect them to do so.

Perhaps it's that balancing act that sums up Gustavsson's reign? It could have been so much more. But that can't take away from what it was.