On Saturday, newly returned Rudy Gobert had a solid game with 16 points, seven rebounds and three blocks in 28 minutes, while his big-man cohort Derrick Favors was even better with 14 points, 12 rebounds, three assists and one steal in 32 minutes during a win over the LA Clippers. However, it should be noted that this type of strong dual performance from both Utah Jazz big men has been few and far between this season.
Favors was once thought to be the power forward of the future in Utah, but injuries derailed his past couple of seasons right around the time Gobert was developing into the franchise center of the now and future in Utah. With Favors healthy this season, there was some thought that Gobert (average draft position of 13.8 overall ) and Favors (ADP 112.5) could thrive together as a dominant, twin-towers unit -- much weaker offensively but certainly stronger defensively (and possibly on the glass) than Anthony Davis and DeMarcus Cousins in New Orleans.
However, this hasn't happened to date. Instead, Gobert has been surprisingly ineffective all season, even when healthy, with a 6.98 score on the Player Rater by average this season, 14th among centers for a player drafted on average 14th overall. Favors has had his best season in years during the times when Gobert has missed time due to injury (14.9 PPG, 58.2 FG%, 8.6 RPG, 1.3 BPG during 23 games during Gobert's two big injury absences).
However, when Gobert has been healthy, Favors has produced similarly to his nightmare injured seasons of the past couple of years (9.5 PPG, 51.4 FG%, 5.4 RPG, 0.7 BPG in 20 games with Gobert). Why are the bigs in Utah having so much trouble on the whole, when last season, Gobert looked like a future MVP candidate and Favors has had such good results without Gobert?
The short answer is that the bigs are interfering with each other because they don't have enough space to work. But why? To answer that, let's look at how their personnel has changed during the past year, especially on the perimeter.
The top two perimeter players on last season's Jazz were Gordon Hayward and George Hill. Those two slots, this season, are taken by rookie Donovan Mitchell and offseason acquisition Ricky Rubio. There are clear differences in the skill sets of the two pairs of players, with Hayward and Hill as excellent long-range shooters and Mitchell as more of a rim-attacker and Rubio more of a non-shooter distributor.
By the numbers:
Hayward averaged 21.9 points per game on 59.5 percent true shooting, making 39.8 percent of his 3-pointers.
Hill averaged 16.9 points per game on 59.9 percent true shooting, making 40.3 percent of his 3-pointers.
Mitchell averages 19.3 points per game on 55.3 percent true shooting, making 34.1 percent of his 3-pointers.
Rubio averages 11.3 points per game on 50.1 percent true shooting, making 29.7 percent of his 3-pointers.
Though these differences are stark, their shot-types can be broken down further to really tease out how they score. Let's break down the primary perimeter options each year in this way, per Second Spectrum:
Hayward made 59.5 effective field goal percent (eFG%, field goal percentage factoring in 3-pointers made) of his 178 driving-layup attempts (out of 1,339 total shots), but most of his work was from the perimeter. He was outstanding in catch-and-shoot situations, making 74.4 eFG% of his 125 shots, and he was fine on the move as well, making 48.0 eFG% of his 122 catch-and-shoot-relocating shots. He was also relatively strong as a scorer off the dribble, taking 334 pull-up jumpers at a 44.9 eFG% clip and also took 155 shots over screens, hitting them at 52.3 eFG%.
Mitchell is also very effective at driving layups (202 of his 703 shots on the season, 56.4 eFG%), on the catch-and-shoot (73 shots, 71.9 eFG%) and working over screens (66 shots, 60.6 eFG%). Meanwhile, he is not nearly as effective off the dribble, shooting only 36.6 eFG% on 123 pull-up jumpers and 39.7 eFG% on 34 catch-and-shoot relocating situations, where he has to dribble before putting up the shot.
This is a massive improvement for the rookie Mitchell over what he was doing just two years ago as a high school player, when he was primarily just a power dunker as illustrated below by ESPN's Mike Schmitz, but it's still a distinct step back in primary perimeter scoring ability compared with Hayward.
How Utah Jazz rookie Donovan Mitchell went from raw, energetic high school power dunker to shot-making NBA lead guard with star potential https://t.co/xNBzamjJrR pic.twitter.com/QFI8y371Yr
- Mike Schmitz (@Mike_Schmitz) January 19, 2018
Put it together, and during the 2017-18 season, this lack of perimeter scoring ability allows defenses to play them differently. They aren't creating any space for the bigs to work. In fact, since leading scorer Mitchell also has his best impact driving to the rim, he serves only to clog the paint more and further minimize the area Gobert and Favors can work from.
From a fantasy perspective, then, the attenuated numbers of Gobert, and the Gobert/Favors combo, are essentially systemic and unlikely to dramatically improve organically with the current roster. Thus, Gobert and Favors could really be worth trading, if you are able to get back any name-recognition (for Gobert) or recent play (Favors) value.
However, there are some possibilities for things to get better for the Jazz big men's fantasy fortunes this season:
For one thing, the other two primary perimeter players from last season (Rodney Hood and Joe Ingles) are both still playing large roles for the team, and both are strong perimeter scorers, so when they are on the court, they do help create some spacing. More importantly, all of the perimeter players outside of Rubio are strong at playing the pick-and-roll/pop game. This was a strength last season, as well.
Per Second Spectrum:
2016-17
Hayward (strong): 0.93 pts/chance, 1,829 picks; 1,073 of those picks set by Gobert (0.94 pts/chance)
Hill (strong): 0.947 points/chance, 1,812 picks; 800 of those picks set by Gobert (0.964 pts/chance)
2017-18
Mitchell (strong): 0.944 pts/chance, 1,038 picks; 388 of those picks set by Favors (0.913 pts/chance)
Rubio (weaker): 0.885 pts/chance, 1,307 picks; 412 of those picks set by Favors (0.873 pts/chance)
2016-18
Ingles over 2-season span: 0.908 pts/chance, 1,433 picks; Gobert .917 pts/chance 631 picks; Favors 0.939 pts/chance 393 picks
Hood over 2-year span: 0.950 pts/chance, 1,322 picks; Gobert .88 pts/chance, 514 picks; Favors 1.011 pts/chance, 292 picks)
The reported points produced are for the team as a whole, not just the ball handler, so it seems that both last season and this, the Jazz have been effective generating offense off the pick-and-roll (this has been a staple in Utah since the John Stockton and Karl Malone days). Both Gobert (last season) and Favors (this season) have proved effective as the big in these scenarios.
The weakest perimeter partners here have been Rubio and Ingles. Thus, if the Jazz recognize this pattern and run more pick-and-play with Mitchell and Hood as the ball handlers and Ingles as the weakside shooter, it could lead to more effective usage of their bigs and perhaps more space for them to work.
The most obvious second fix also comes out here: Put them out there without Rubio. He is an apparent weak link as both a shooter and as the ball handler on the pick-and-roll/pop game, and this is squeezing the effectiveness out of their two big men. I have no inside information about whether the Jazz have Rubio on the trade block, but his minutes have gone down this season (29.1 MPG) compared to last (32.9 MPG in Minnesota), so perhaps the Jazz are noticing that he just doesn't work as well with their personnel.
All told, the Jazz bigs don't have nearly the fantasy outlook for this season as might have been anticipated in the offseason. But if the Jazz make some adjustments as a team, working to their strengths and avoiding their weaknesses, there is still at least a bit of upside for things to get better.
Gobert is still the franchise player on the team, with Mitchell bidding to join him on that perch. As such, it is in the Jazz's best interest to put the personnel out there and play the scheme that best allows for both to be maximally effective.